A prosectorial model can lead to a fairer and more efficient enforcement in cartel cases

Abstract

A prosectorial model can lead to a fairer and more efficient enforcement in cartel casesThis article aims at investigating whether a big structural reform of the powers of the European Commission when enforcing Art. 101 TFEU in cartel cases could entail more fairness and more efficiency. Indeed, after analyzing how the procedure works, the alleged criminal nature of competition fines and the issues related to judicial review, this paper argues that a prosecutorial model would make the whole system better off".How the procedure works, the main criticisms, facession of the EU to the ECHR, Fines, the same officials draft the final decision; the final decision is formally taken by the 27 Commissioners and the role of the Hearing Officer, Judicial review, efficiency and length of the proceedingsKey words: Cartels, Prosecutorial Model, Fairness, Efficiency, Public Enforcement