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### ИЗ "СТРАН ТРЕТЬЕГО МИРА" В ЕВРОПУ: СПЕЦИФИКА СОВРЕМЕННОЙ МИГРАЦИИ ИЗ АФРИКИ И БЛИЖНЕГО ВОСТОКА

*Раскрыты основные теоретические и практические аспекты современной миграции в Европу с начала XX века до нынешнего времени на примере стран Африки и Ближнего Востока. Представлен анализ исторических и современных сил, побуждающих жителей Африканского континента к миграции в Европу, основанный на информации о странах происхождения мигрантов и странах, в которых они проживают. Сформирован обобщенный социологический и географический образ мигранта из Африки в Европу. Определены пути, которые используют жители Африки и Ближнего Востока для миграции в Европу, а также отмечена взаимосвязь между исторической общностью стран происхождения и стран проживания. Рассмотрены основные транзитные страны на пути из Африки и с Ближнего Востока. Представлен ряд местных инициатив представителей диаспоры, направленных на представление интересов и прав мигрантов, инициативы сформированы по принципу стран происхождения. Так, особое внимание уделено как гуманитарным инициативам представителей диаспор, так и деятельности политических сил в изгнании в странах проживания и местным политическим объединениям представителей диаспор.*

*Ключевые слова:* миграция, ЕС, Африка, Ближний Восток, диаспора, социология.

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### З "КРАЇН ТРЕТЬОГО СВІТУ" ДО ЄВРОПИ: СПЕЦИФИКА СУЧАСНОЇ МІГРАЦІЇ З АФРИКИ ТА БЛИЗЬКОГО СХОДУ

*Розкрито основні теоретичні та практичні аспекти сучасної міграції до Європи від початку XX ст. до сьогодні на прикладі країн Африки та Близького Сходу. Подано аналіз історичних і сучасних рушійних сил, що спонукають жителів Африканського континенту мігрувати до Європи, заснований на інформації про країни походження мигрантів і країн, у яких вони проживають. Сформовано загальний соціологічний і географічний образ мигранта з Африки до Європи. Визначено шляхи, якими користуються мешканці Африканського континенту та Близького Сходу для міграції до Європи, а також виявлено взаємозв'язок між історичною взаємопов'язаністю країн походження та країн проживання. Розглянуто основні транзитні країни на шляху з Африки та Близького Сходу. Представлено низку місцевих ініціатив представників діаспори, спрямованих на представлення інтересів та прав мигрантів, та сформовано їх за принципом країн походження. Зокрема, особливу увагу приділено як гуманітарним ініціативам представників діаспор, так і діяльності політичних сил в екзилі в країнах проживання та місцевим політичним об'єднанням представників діаспор.*

*Ключові слова:* міграція, ЄС, Африка, Близький Схід, діаспора, соціологія.

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### THE EU'S BLACK SEA POLICY PRIORITIES FOR THE UPCOMING DECADE

*The European Union's interest in the Black Sea region, which has never been at the forefront of the EU's foreign policy agenda, is dynamic demonstrated by the policy of a new, more powerful Union after Lisbon. Despite the urgency of the Black Sea's hard security issues stipulated by militarization of the region by Russia, the European Union is focusing on connectivity, sustainable development, the blue economy and energy. It is this agenda that will determine the EU's policy in the region for the next decade. Understanding these priorities is important for shaping Ukraine's foreign policy, security, energy and environmental agendas.*

*Keywords:* European Union, Black Sea region, Russia, agenda for Ukraine.

**Problem statement.** The significance of the Black Sea region in the EU's foreign policy is stipulated by the accession to the Union in 2007 of the two Black Sea states – Romania and Bulgaria. This implied gaining the access by the EU to the region and the need emerged to develop its own position and political priorities in the direction of the Black Sea region. Factors of the second row for the shaping and maintenance of the foreign policy agenda for the region are the following: the policies of the EU's neighbors and traditional rivals in the Black Sea (Russia and Turkey); the desire of other littoral states (Ukraine and Georgia) to join the Union. A number of important sea trade ports, the largest of which is located in the EU Member State (Constanta, Romania); the inflow of the Danube, the most important waterway in Central and Eastern European countries, into the Black Sea; the construction of energy pipelines and cables via the Black Sea region.

The European Union perceives the region as a space for cooperation to respond to the challenges of sustainable development and a norm-based international order. The Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy 2016 [1] calls for the development of such a cooperative regional order. As one of the most powerful global leaders, trade and investment centers, the Union exploits regional cooperation platforms both to strengthen the social stability of the regions themselves and to build their own capacity. The Black Sea format of regional cooperation complements other formats, such as the Northern Dimension, cooperation around the Adriatic, Ionian, Baltic, Mediterranean Seas and Atlantic Ocean.

These and other issues shape the priorities of the EU policy towards the region. Understanding the perception of the region by the EU, the priorities of its policy gives an opportunity for the littoral states (including Ukraine) to con-

struct proper expectations from the EU policy as well as shaping their proposals for the contributions into the region's development.

*Goal of the article.* The main goal of the article is directed at illustration of the EU policy towards the Black Sea region evolution from perception of the region as a periphery to attributing it more significant role and shaping the latest priorities of the Union which will determine its foreign policy for the next decade.

*Analysis of the recent sources.* The splash of publications analyzing the EU Black sea policy preceded or followed the entrance into force of the Lisbon treaty in 2009 which pushed forward the EU regional policies. The publications analyzed which approach the EU should initiate towards the region where Russia had been testing the "geopolitical regionalism". The proposal addressed the "transformative" and "compensatory" regionalism for the EU [2]. The majority of publications came from the littoral states which were direct addresses of the EU policy [3; 4]. Recent decade the attention and interest towards the analysis of the EU Black Sea policy decreased that is stipulated by the development of alternative regional projects by the EU and shifts in security and geopolitical environment. Still recent years the region obtains new dimensions in the EU policy with its economic, energy, environmental attractiveness that is left beyond the academic publications and this lack the present article aims to cover.

*Main body of the text.* The extension of the EU policy to the Black Sea region was initially considered within the concept of transformational regionalism, interpreting the EU's transformational power as a number of normative, technical and material instruments offered to partners for cooperation in order to achieve desired transformations [5, p. 5] (e. g. introduction of European standards and norms in different areas). Meanwhile another perspective favoured the concept of compensatory regionalism [2] understanding it as a provision to certain partners-neighbours of benefits from cooperation that would perform a compensation function for the exclusion from the processes of integration (for those whom the EU does not see among its members).

The Black Sea region is seen by the EU as communicative proven by being included into the Draft Strategy Connecting Europe and Asia – Building blocks for an EU strategy (№ 12720/18 of 15.10.2018) [6] with an emphasis on its connecting role and the importance of maritime transport. The region is also closely linked to the EU's strategy for Central Asia. In the context of cooperation in the Black Sea region on the road between Europe and Asia, the EU Council emphasizes four priorities: transport, energy, digitalisation and contacts. At the same time, the Black Sea region together with the Mediterranean and Central Asia are perceived by the EU through the prism of challenges they pose as a corridor for the illegal supply of drugs, smuggling, resource provision to terrorist groups, illegal migration etc.

The European Union is very cautious in putting forward and implementing initiatives for the Black Sea region, recognizing that the Black Sea is a closed (inland) sea of littoral states and therefore, initiatives must come from within the region itself. At the same time, the Black Sea region is very heterogeneous, including two EU member states (Bulgaria and Romania), Eastern Partnership member states (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan), a candidate state (Turkey) and an important strategic EU partner – Russia. The countries of the region are involved in a number of structures and initiatives – the Eastern Partnership program, the Three Seas Initiative, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC), the Black Sea Commission, the Black Sea Euroregion, the Black Sea

Harmony initiative. This environment neither produce the unified formats of cooperation both from the states of the region as well as the EU, nor facilitate the development of a unified EU policy towards the region, that definitely affects the quality and depth of cooperation.

The EU's Black Sea region includes not only littoral states (like Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Georgia, Russia), but also states that have historically and geographically always been associated with economic and political processes in the region (like Greece, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan).

The EU Black Sea policy is developed and implemented as a component of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP).

The first step of the EU in building relations with the countries of the region and within the region was the Black Sea Synergy initiative, set out in the Proposal of the European Commission to the EU Council and the European Parliament "Black Sea Synergy – New Regional Cooperation Initiative" (April 11, 2007) [7]. This initiative is not a separate EU strategy, it is also a part of the European Neighborhood Policy, funded by its fund and provides for the development of mutual cooperation within the region and between the countries of the region and the EU. The official start of the Black Sea Synergy was given at a ministerial conference in Kyiv in February 2008. Prior to that, relations with the countries of the region developed mainly through partnership and cooperation agreements.

On the way of implementation of the Black Sea Synergy, the EU does not aim to establish new institutional mechanisms, but instead defines the functional areas of multilateral cooperation as following:

- democratization, good governance and respect for human rights. Supporting regional initiatives through the dissemination of their own experience (training, exchange of experience) to promote respect for human rights and the establishment of good governance in the countries of the region. Black Sea forums of representatives of civil society organizations are held annually to discuss issues of development, anti-corruption measures, ensuring the rights of children and youth;
- strengthening border controls in order to reduce the level of such threats as trafficking in human beings, trade in weapons and drugs, organized crime, terrorist activities, illegal migration;
- settlement of protracted conflicts by overcoming the deficit of economic growth, social cohesion, building confidence-building measures (the EU has been active in settling the conflict in Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, the Russian-Georgian war and the Russian-Ukrainian war. In particular, the EU took part in the Geneva negotiating format on the conflict resolution while Germany and France are key states in the Normandy negotiating format, and restrictive measures imposed by the EU aim at deterring Russia's policy.

Both the EU Global Strategy 2016 and a number of other documents of the EU Council condemn the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia, emphasize the support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, freedom of navigation in the Black Sea. The special EU voice goes to the compliance with the norms of international law in the Black Sea region as a guarantee of harmonious cooperation in the region.

Romania has been a major promoter of an enhanced EU-NATO response to Russia's militarization of the Black Sea. Romanian 2016 Initiative regarding the formation of a multinational Black Sea Fleet [8, P.14] for enhanced patrols has not been implemented, inter alia, due to the refusal of Bulgaria;

- security of energy supply, which should ensure uninterrupted supply of Black Sea-Caspian energy resources to EU member states, and diversification of supplies.

The Treaty on the European Energy Community is extended to Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, while Turkey has an observer status. Legal and regulatory harmonization should be facilitated by the Baku Initiative (involving all Black Sea coastal states and all former Soviet republics except the Baltic states), which aims at creating an integrated energy market with common legal and technical standards, strengthening security of energy supply through expansion and modernization of existing infrastructure.

Among the infrastructural projects is the construction of the Trans-Caspian-Black Sea Energy Corridor to transport Central Asian gas to the EU. The use of the Black Sea by the European Union to transport Central Asian and Caucasian oil and gas to the EU encounters an active energy policy of Russia and Turkey. Thus, the fiasco of two competing gas pipeline projects – the EU initiative Nabucco and the Russian initiative South Stream in 2013 and 2014, as well as the launch of the Blue Stream gas pipeline from Russia to Turkey are symptomatic examples of competition. At the same time, the launch of the TANAP gas pipeline in 2019 for the transportation of gas from Azerbaijan via Turkey to Europe and its connection to the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline have become a successful example of the EU's diversification of its own energy dependence on gas supplies from Russia through the Black Sea region.

The Bruja gas pipeline as a part of the Southern Gas Corridor is seen in the EU as a new export route for the future developments in the Black Sea, primarily near Romania. The Bruya gas pipeline starts from the southern part of the country and extends to the western, in fact, to the Hungarian-Serbian border. It is a part of the future Bulgarian, Romanian, Hungarian and Austrian gas interconnector and will connect the Bulgarian and Hungarian gas pipelines.

Romania intends to increase gas production from the Black Sea shelf in the near future. The Deep Neptune project has already been launched by OMV and ExxonMobil. It will allow Romania not only to satisfy its own gas needs, but also to export gas to neighboring Hungary. Unlike Romania, Bulgaria does not have its own gas storage facilities, which make it difficult to diversify gas supplies from Russia.

At the same time, over the last ten years, due to the economic crisis, the rebalancing of players at the energy market, the share of gas transported by pipelines has fallen significantly. Instead, increasing attention is being paid to liquefied natural gas (LNG) and the construction of LNG terminals, which are in short supply on the Black Sea coast.

In this context, the Black Sea plays a special role in the Three Seas Initiative (Adriatic, Baltic, Black Seas). The project is not the EU initiative but was proposed by its members – Poland and Croatia in 2015. It provides for the establishment of communication between the north and south of Europe through the development of gas pipelines, railways, roads, and power grids. The development of LNG terminals in Poland and Croatia is a good example for the Black Sea countries.

The EU is enhancing its attention to alternative energy sources by supporting relevant projects in Romania and Bulgaria, in particular in the field of wind energy on the Black Sea coast.

- transport (priority – combination of trans-European networks with transport communications of the Black Sea states. Special emphasis is made on the TRACECA project, launched in 1993, the Europe-Caucasus-Asia transport corridor project, which aims at connecting the Black Sea-Caspian Basin states and the EU by roads, railways, air and marine communication lines using granting

technical assistance. The EU 2001 Motorways of the Sea project [9] envisages among four directions the connection of the countries of South-Eastern Europe with the Black Sea through the establishment of connections between seaports, development of infrastructure, cargo terminals, logistics platforms);

- fishing (protection, effective management, storage, research, data collection);

- environmental protection (with a focus on responding to climate change and water quality deterioration, waste management, industrial water and air pollution. The focus is also made on building a network of clusters of cross-sectoral cooperation between industry, service providers and research institutions);

- trade, educational and scientific cooperation;

- cross-border cooperation (between local authorities, non-governmental organizations, business associations).

The European Commission assesses the development of the Black Sea Synergy initiative in three of its reports. The last report approved on March 5, 2019 (for the period 2015–2018) [10], emphasizes the growth of the blue or maritime economy and cooperation in the direction of a common integrated maritime policy, maritime research and innovation; renewable energy sources; security of the Black Sea ecosystem.

In 2010 within the framework of the Black Sea Synergy, the Black Sea Environmental Partnership initiative was launched in order to respond to common environmental challenges in the region. The EU's further work with partners has largely focused on protecting and conserving the Black Sea ecosystem. The main instrument for the protection of the marine environment of the Black Sea region remains the EU Marine Strategy Framework Directive of 2008 (applies to Romania and Bulgaria as members of the EU, as well as to Ukraine and Georgia in the context of the Association Agreements).

Important tools for the development of the EU Black Sea policy were adopted in May 2019. The Common Maritime Agenda and the Blue Economy Partnership Strategic Research and Innovation Agenda serve as the basis for the allocation of funding by both the EU and national governments and international investors. Common Maritime Agenda [11] supported on May 21, 2019 by Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Turkey, Russia (based on the Ministerial Declaration on the Common Maritime Agenda for the Black Sea, Burgas, May 31, 2018 laid the framework for further narrower and deeper projects and funding. This initiative finalized the priorities of the Romanian Presidency in the Council of the EU and was supposed to regulate the most promising and most successful areas of development interesting both to the EU and partner countries. Cooperation within the initiative is carried out through the coordinator and the Ad Hoc Steering Committee. Ministerial meetings are also held when needed.

The main objectives of the Maritime Agenda are:

1. a healthy ecosystem of the Black Sea, which implies the following priorities:

- study, monitoring and prediction of the state and changes of the ecosystem, identification of areas in need of protection;

- combating marine pollution with plastic wastes (focus on education and awareness-raising; implementation of the Regional Action Plan on Black Sea Waste Pollution, Prevention of Pollution the sources for which are ports and ships);

- development of sustainable fisheries and aquaculture in the Black Sea region (regulatory rules are developed by the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (FAO) a member of which the EU is. The Commission is considered by the EU as the best platform for dis-

cussing and choosing regulatory measures for fishing in the Black Sea region (receives annual grants from the EU); a Black Sea group has been set up as a subsidiary body to the Commission);

- support of the innovative infrastructure of marine research in the Black Sea region; dissemination of knowledge and information about the Black Sea ecosystem;

2. Development of a sustainable blue (or marine) economy (the implementation of this goal is based on the document Blue Growth Initiative for Research and Innovation in the Black Sea, Burgas, 2018) [12]. Implementation priorities are:

- development of innovative business models, stimulation of research, in particular: introduction of innovations in the field of marine technologies and biotechnologies; research in the field of renewable energy, sustainable fisheries and other food sources;

- attraction of investments, strengthening of transport and digital communication between the states of the region (green and safe navigation, eco-ports, promotion of substitution of oil as a fuel for vessels by liquefied and compressed natural gas);

- promotion of skills and career growth in the blue economy;

3. Intensification of investments in the blue economy of the Black Sea region; promotion of entrepreneurial activity and development of clusters in the maritime sphere.

In support of the Common Maritime Agenda, the Agenda for Blue Economy Growth Strategic Research and Innovation Agenda in the Black Sea Region was launched in Bucharest in May 2019. Its four pillars are the exchange of knowledge about the Black Sea ecosystem, promoting the blue economy of the Black Sea region, developing support and research systems to build innovative infrastructure, training professionals who can work effectively and promote the blue economy.

The European Commission has proposed the launch of "Measures for the growth of the blue economy in the Black Sea region" to support maritime cooperation between member states, finding sources and policy approaches for the blue economy. Practical assistance is provided by the European Maritime Safety Agency. The EU actively supports the European Network for Maritime Observation and Data Collection.

Due to the fact that a number of European Union countries are states of the Danube basin, the EU's attention to Black Sea cooperation is explained among other issues by the confluence of the Danube and the Black Sea. The EU Strategy for the Danube Region (2011) correlates with the EU's activities in the Black Sea region. So far, common challenges for the Danube macro-region and the Black Sea region are connections (transport and energy infrastructure, tourism and contacts); environmental protection (water quality and water management, environmental risks, biodiversity); socio-economic aspects (knowledge society, education and skills development, competition); institutional capacity and security. Increasing the number of freight transport on the Danube involves the development of existing and development of new ports on the Black Sea coast.

At the institutional level, the EU supports a multilateral dialogue with the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), which is of particular interest to the EU due to membership of the Western Balkan states (Albania and Serbia) in BSEC, which connects the space between the Black and Adriatic Seas.

The EU can get more legal instruments to strengthen EU activity in the Black Sea region by acceding to the 1992 Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea against Pol-

lution (Bucharest Convention) and its intergovernmental body – the Black Sea Commission, that the EU has been striving for since 2009.

In conclusion it worth mentioning that nowadays the major priority approach of the EU towards a broad Black Sea region is not hard security stipulated by the Russia's attempt of illegal annexation of Crimea and further militarization of the Black Sea basin. These issues are left for the NATO and the US consideration while the EU focuses on energy issues connecting the region with the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas shaping a broad map; formation of new connections; blue economy and environmental protection support.

Today, the Black Sea region remains an arena of intersection of mutually exclusive and intersecting interests and initiatives for cooperation, primarily energy. This complicates their implementation at the multilateral level, leaving the dominant bilateral formats of cooperation in which the individual interests of players are satisfied.

The European Union initiates cooperation in the Black Sea region, primarily involving a bottom-up approach, when initiatives and projects are put forward from within the region with the involvement of NGOs and local businesses in order to implement certain priorities, which are: maintaining stability and security in its south-eastern borders, sustainable development, growth of the blue economy, protection of the Black Sea ecosystem, development of energy projects.

The main promoters of the EU's involvement in the Black Sea region are the coastal states – Romania and Bulgaria, which are dedicated to their respective presidencies in the EU Council on regional issues.

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### ПОЛІТИЧНІ ПРІОРИТЕТИ ЄС ЩОДО ЧОРНОМОРСЬКОГО РЕГІОНУ НА НАСТУПНЕ ДЕСЯТИЛІТТЯ

*Интерес Европейского Союза до регіону Чорного моря, який ніколи не обіймав провідних позицій у зовнішньополітичному порядку денному ЄС, є динамічним, що продемонструвала політика нового потужнішого Союзу після Лісабону. Попри значну нагальність проблем жорсткої безпеки в Чорноморському регіоні, пов'язаних з милітаризацією регіону Росією, Європейський Союз концентрується на питаннях розвитку сполучень, сталого розвитку, синьої економіки й енергетики. Саме цей порядок денний буде визначати політику ЄС у регіоні на найближчу декаду. Розуміння цих пріоритетів є важливим для формування зовнішньополітичного, безпекового, енергетичного й екологічного порядку денного Україною.*

*Ключові слова: Європейський Союз, Чорноморський регіон, Росія, порядок денний для України.*

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### ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЕ ПРИОРИТЕТЫ ЕС ПО ОТНОШЕНИЮ К РЕГИОНУ ЧЕРНОГО МОРЯ НА СЛЕДУЮЩЕЕ ДЕСЯТИЛЕТИЕ

*Интерес Европейского Союза к региону Черного моря, который никогда не занимал ведущих позиций во внешнеполитической повестке дня ЕС, является динамическим, что демонстрирует политика обновленного более влиятельного Союза после Лиссабона. Несмотря на существенную актуальность проблем жесткой безопасности в Черноморском регионе, связанных с милитаризацией региона Россией, Европейский Союз концентрируется на вопросах развития сообщений, устойчивого развития, синей экономики и энергетики. Именно эта повестка дня будет определять политику ЕС в регионе на ближайшую декаду. Понимание данных приоритетов является важным для формирования внешнеполитической, энергетической и экологической повестки дня Украины, как и политики безопасности.*

*Ключевые слова: Европейский Союз, Черноморский регион, Россия, повестка дня для Украины.*

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### ЕВОЛЮЦІЯ СТРАТЕГІЇ НАЦІОНАЛЬНОЇ БЕЗПЕКИ РЕСПУБЛІКИ СІНГАПУР

*Розглянуто еволюцію стратегії національної безпеки Республіки Сінгапур відповідно до конкретних загроз на різних етапах розвитку країни. На основі аналізу Стратегії національної безпеки, прийнятої в 2004 р., автор досліджує конкретні заходи, вжиті урядом країни для подолання безпекових викликів, та способи налагодження міжвідомчої координації органів державної влади, бізнес-структур і громадянського суспільства. Зважаючи на інноваційність і відкритість економіки Республіки Сінгапур, значну увагу приділено стратегії боротьби з кіберзагрозами, а також співробітництву з іншими країнами задля спільного подолання безпекових викликів.*

*Ключові слова: Республіка Сінгапур, національна безпека, транснаціональний тероризм, міжвідомча координація, кібербезпека, соціальна гармонія.*

**Вступ.** Республіка Сінгапур є цікавим об'єктом для дослідження національної безпеки, зважаючи на складні геополітичні умови. Стаття є спробою простежити еволюцію стратегії національної безпеки цієї держави з часу проголошення її незалежності в 1965 році й до сьогодні.

Безперечно, за цей проміжок часу змінилися геополітичне середовище Сінгапуру та його місце на міжнародній арені. Відповідно змінилися й основні виклики, які загрожують безпеці держави. Після проголошення незалежності Сінгапуру загрози національній безпеці мали як зовнішній, так і внутрішній характер. Передусім варто відзначити складні геополітичні обставини, у яких опинилася країна (насамперед ідеться про загрози від найближчих сусідів – Малайзії, Індонезії та КНР). Збройні сили Сінгапуру на той час були нечисленими та технічно погано оснащеними, тому оточення вороже налаштованих держав становило реальну небезпеку. Водночас країна практично позбавлена власних ресурсів, тому змушена була експортувати навіть воду й пісок. Крім того, потенційну загрозу національній безпеці Сінгапуру становила його етнічна неоднорідність.

Сьогодні внутрішньо- та зовнішньополітичні обставини, безумовно, змінилися. Сінгапур володіє найкращими збройними силами в регіоні (за даними SIPRI) та витрачає великі суми на оборону щороку (3,2 % ВВП) [2]. Завдяки тотальному відеоспостереженню у країні спостерігається дуже низький рівень внутрішньої злочинності. У міжнародних відносинах уряд до-

тримується принципу балансу сил. Ідеться про співробітництво як зі США, так і з КНР без односторонньої залежності від них, а також про балансування між партнерством із Китаєм і дистанціюванням від нього. Паралельно Сінгапур розвиває добросусідські відносини з Малайзією та Індонезією. Спостерігається також зростання впливу держави в межах АСЕАН, що потенційно може стати запорукою безпеки.

Як бачимо, основні загрози національній безпеці змінилися, у результаті еволюціонувала стратегія боротьби з ними.

Наше дослідження стратегії національної безпеки Сінгапуру після проголошення його незалежності будується на основі мемуарів Лі Куана Ю та офіційних документів Міністерства оборони, яке на той час очолював Го Кен Сві. Аналіз сучасних загроз, які уряд визначає як пріоритетні, здійснений на основі Стратегії національної безпеки, прийнятої в 2004 році, а також розгляду діяльності *Координаційного центру національної безпеки* та його аналітичних звітів. Зважаючи на інноваційність економіки Сінгапуру, значну загрозу для безпеки країни на цьому етапі становлять кібератаки, тому доцільно буде також проаналізувати Стратегію кібербезпеки 2018 року.

**Історична довідка.** Після проголошення незалежності в 1965 Сінгапур опинився у ворожому оточенні трьох значно більших за розміром та військовим потенціалом держав. Влада Малайзії здійснювала тиск на економіку й